A sixteenth Soviet republic?

Episode 09 · Period covered: 1963–1973 · Reading time: 4 min

Companion article to episode 09 of the Cold War Bulgaria podcast.

One of the most extraordinary aspects of Bulgarian policy during the Cold War remains Todor Zhivkov's repeated proposals to bring his country into the Soviet Union as its sixteenth republic.

The episode is little known outside Bulgaria. It is nonetheless documented in the archives, and it illuminates the true nature of the relationship between Sofia and Moscow better than any other.

Two attempts

The archives confirm that Zhivkov formally approached the Soviet leadership on two occasions with the idea of complete unification: in 1963 with Nikita Khrushchev, then in 1973 with Leonid Brezhnev.

In December 1963, before a plenary session of the Central Committee (ЦК на БКП) of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Zhivkov argued that "the ultimate objective is unification with the Soviet Union". The formula was not an isolated rhetorical flourish: it accompanied concrete steps.

The Soviet refusal

Moscow systematically declined these offers. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev saw the drawbacks of formal annexation.

The administrative and financial cost. Integrating a country of seven million inhabitants, with its economy, its infrastructure and its social obligations, would have weighed heavily on an already strained Soviet budget.

The dangerous precedent. Accepting Bulgaria would have raised the question for the other states of the bloc, and opened a debate Moscow had no interest in seeing arise.

The loss of a diplomatic instrument. A formally independent Bulgaria was worth more than a Soviet Bulgaria. It held a seat at the United Nations, maintained its own diplomatic relations, and possessed a capacity for action in the Third World that the USSR could not exercise directly without compromising itself.

Moscow therefore preferred to keep an "independent" ally that followed every directive while serving as a buffer and a diplomatic relay.

An economic stratagem

The soundest interpretation of these proposals is not ideological but economic.

Zhivkov used the prospect of unification as a bargaining lever. The 1973 meeting with Brezhnev in Sofia, the minutes of which have been published, shows the Bulgarian leader using the subject to obtain additional financial aid and Soviet support on the Macedonian question in his relations with Yugoslavia.

In other words: by offering to renounce his sovereignty, Zhivkov extracted the best price for it. The proposal was sincere in its formulation and instrumental in its use.

This reading is consistent with his policy as a whole. Subsidised oil, the cancellation of a billion roubles of debt in 1979, the 400 million roubles a year for agriculture: Bulgarian loyalty was remunerated, and the proposal of unification was its most far-reaching expression.

What Bulgaria gave in return

The echo within the institutions

The idea of the sixteenth republic did not remain confined to exchanges at the summit. It permeated the culture of Bulgarian institutions.

State Security conceived of itself as a "regional branch of the KGB", in the phrase Zhivkov used after a meeting with Yuri Andropov in 1969. The army was structured as a direct extension of the Red Army, to the point that Moscow judged it unnecessary to station troops there.

What the proposals of 1963 and 1973 would have formalised in law already existed in practice across several sectors of the state.

The late erosion

Declassified CIA analyses from 1984 suggest that by the end of the Cold War this subordination was beginning to produce tensions.

The Soviet Union, confronted with its own economic decline, was setting about reducing what it called the cost of empire. It now demanded higher-quality Bulgarian exports and an increased defence effort. The implicit contract, loyalty in exchange for resources, was deteriorating to Sofia's disadvantage.

Five years later, the regime fell. The question of the sixteenth republic was never settled otherwise than by the polite refusal of two general secretaries.

How to read this episode

The anecdote is often cited to illustrate Bulgarian servility. That is a short reading.

What it says above all is that in an asymmetrical system of alliance, the smaller partner sometimes has unexpected room for manoeuvre. Zhivkov knew his strategic position (the border with two NATO members, the proximity of the Straits) and he extracted everything he could from it.

He proposed unification probably knowing it would be refused, and because that refusal allowed him to keep negotiating. It is one way of understanding why Bulgaria was, to the very end, the most faithful ally: fidelity was its principal asset.

Sources

• Minutes of the Zhivkov–Brezhnev meetings, Bulgarian Historical Library
• Archives of the Central Committee of the BCP (ЦК на БКП)
• Declassified CIA analyses

The documentation available on this episode remains limited; uncorroborated elements are flagged in the text.